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Abstract
From TV news to Google StreetView, face obscu-
ration has been used for privacy protection. Due
to recent advances in the field of deep learning, ob-
scuration methods such as Gaussian blurring and
pixelation are not guaranteed to conceal identity.
In this paper, we propose a utility-preserving gen-
erative model, UP-GAN, that is able to provide an
effective face obscuration, while preserving facial
utility. By utility-preserving we mean preserving
facial features that do not reveal identity, such as
age, gender, skin tone, pose, and expression. We
show that the proposed method achieves the best
performance in terms of obscuration and utility
preservation.
1. Introduction
Major developments in the machine learning field have un-
covered severe flaws in current face obscuration approaches.
As shown by (McPherson et al., 2016), machine learning
methods are able to defeat Gaussian blurring or pixelation
based obscuration methods. These obscuration techniques
have been widely used by Internet news outlets, social me-
dia platforms, and government agencies. An extreme resort
to prevent information leaking is to simply gray out the
entire facial region by setting all pixels in the facial area to
a fixed value. However, this approach is rarely used because
its visual effect is unpleasant, especially if there are many
faces to be redacted. Besides the identifiable information,
facial images also contain information that does not reveal
identity, such as age, gender, and skin tone. Often, we want
to preserve these features in many applications involving
visual understanding and data mining (Du et al., 2014).
New obscuration methods are needed to remove identifiable
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Figure 1. Obscuration effect of the proposed method. First row:
original faces; second row: obscured faces.
facial information, while preserving the features that do not
convey identity. The proposed method, utility-preserving
GAN (UP-GAN), aims to provide an effective obscuration
by generating faces that only depend on the non-identifiable
facial features. In this work, we define utility as the facial
properties such as age, gender, skin tone, pose, and expres-
sion. We choose these properties because in practice, when
dealing with a large number of identities, knowing these
properties from the obscured images cannot reveal identity.
One can also choose other properties to retain for different
applications. As shown in Figure 1, UP-GAN is able to
obscure the original faces by replacing them with synthetic
faces that have the same utility.
The main contributions of this work are summarized as
follows. First, we develop a model that can produce new
faces for obscuration. Then, we provide an evaluation to
show the effectiveness of the proposed method with different
training objectives. Finally, compared to different methods,
we show that UP-GAN can provide the best performance in
terms of face obscuration and utility preservation.
2. Related Work
Standard approaches, such as pixelation and Gaussian blur-
ring, achieve good obscuration performance in terms of
human perception. However, (McPherson et al., 2016) pro-
posed a deep learning method with a simple structure that is
able to defeat these obscuration techniques. To provide bet-
ter obscuration performance, a variety of approaches have
been proposed to balance the need to remove identifiable
information while preserving utility information.
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2.1. Face De-identification
k-same Methods. This family of approaches first groups
faces into clusters based on non-identifiable information
such as expression, and then generates a surrogate face for
each cluster. These methods can guarantee that any face
recognition system cannot do better than 1/k in recognizing
who a particular image corresponds to (Gross et al., 2005),
where k is the minimum number of faces among all clusters.
This property is also known as k-anonymity (Samarati &
Sweeney, 1998). In (Newton et al., 2005) and (Gross et al.,
2005), they simply compute the average face for each cluster.
Therefore, their obscured faces are blurry and cannot handle
various facial poses. In (Du et al., 2014), the use of an
active appearance model (Cootes et al., 2001) to generate
more realistic surrogate faces is presented. A generative
neural network, k-same-net, that directly generates faces
based on the cluster attributes is described in (Meden et al.,
2018). These two methods are able to produce more realistic
obscured faces with the property of k-anonymity, but cannot
handle different poses.
GAN Methods. Generative adversarial network (GAN)
(Goodfellow et al., 2014) methods can provide more real-
istic faces. Their discriminator is designed to guide the
generator by distinguishing real faces from generated faces.
In (Wu et al., 2019), a model that produces obscured faces di-
rectly from original faces based on conditional-GAN (Mirza
& Osindero, 2014) is proposed. They use a contrastive loss
to enforce the obscured face to be different than the input
face. However, since they need to directly input the original
faces, the obscuration performance is not guaranteed. (Sun
et al., 2018) present a two-stage model that is able to gener-
ate an obscured face without the original identifiable facial
information, which prevents the leakage of identifiable in-
formation directly from faces. GANs have also been used
for face manipulation in videos. These techniques aim to
create believable face swaps without tampering traces, by
altering age (Antipov et al., 2017) or skin color (Lu et al.,
2018). To prevent scenarios where these videos are used
to create political distress or fake terrorism events, (Gu¨era
& Delp, 2018) design a deep learning model that is able to
detect the altered frames using both the spatial and temporal
information.
Our proposed method tries to leverage the advantages of
both types of methods. To achieve k-anonymity, it is de-
signed to generate faces that depend only on the utility infor-
mation without directly accessing original faces. Since it is
also a GAN based method, with the discriminator guidance,
it is able to produce more realistic faces than the k-same
methods.
3. Proposed Method
Recall that, in this implementation, we choose age, gender,
skin tone, pose, and expression as the utility to be preserved.
To better formulate our problem, we further divide the utility
into two parts: attributes and landmarks. Attributes define
the static part of the utility information that does not change
with facial movement. Landmarks define a set of points
of interest that describe the facial pose and expression. In
order to obtain obscured faces, we first use an auxiliary
system to detect the utility information: attribute vector va
and landmark vector vl from the original face Ireal. Since,
in this work, we are not focusing on this auxiliary system,
we use the UTKFace dataset (Zhang et al., 2017) which
provides the needed attributes (age, gender, and skin tone)
and landmarks (7 points) to train and test our model. The
fake face Ifake is then generated by the UP-GAN model
using the attribute and landmark vectors. Given that the
generated face has the same pose and expression, we can
swap it with the original face to perform de-identification
using face swapping algorithms (Pe´rez et al., 2003; Bitouk
et al., 2008; Korshunova et al., 2017). Figure 1 shows the
swapping results using (Pe´rez et al., 2003).
Figure 2 shows the generator architecture of the UP-GAN
model, which is based on the architecture proposed by
(Dosovitskiy et al., 2017). Similar to the previous work,
UP-GAN jointly learns the fake face and its binary mask.
However, we modify the structure of the fully-connected lay-
ers to input the attribute and landmark vectors. As suggested
by (Meden et al., 2018), we also add a max pooling layer
with stride 1 for dimension reduction before generating the
output image and mask. More specifically, we first use two
fully-connected layers to encode the input vectors and then
apply de-convolution, followed by another convolution layer
to upsample the feature maps. The de-convolution layer con-
tains an upsampling layer with stride 2 and a convolution
layer with a kernel size of 5. For the following convolution
layer after the de-convolution layer, we choose the kernel
size to be 3. Note that the final output size of the generated
face is 128 × 128 × 3 and the size of the binary mask is
128× 128× 2.
The loss functions for the generator G and discriminator D
are defined as:
LG = Eva,vl [logD(G(va, vl)))]+
λ1L2 + λ2LM + λ3LP ,
LD = EIreal [logD(Ireal)]+
Eva,vl [log (1−D(G(va, vl)))],
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Figure 2. Generator architecture of the UP-GAN model. Yellow
vectors indicate the activation of fully-connected layers. Blue
blocks indicate the activation from de-convolution layers (upsam-
pling + convolution). Yellow blocks show the activation from
following convolution layers after the de-convolution layer. The
red block shows the output from the max pooling layer.
where
L2 = ‖Ireal − Ifake‖22,
LM = − 1
N
N∑
i=1
yi log (pi) + (1− yi) log (1− pi).
LP =
∑
l∈Ω
‖φl(Ifake)− φl(Ireal)‖22,
L2 is the reconstruction loss for learning the image content.
LM is the binary cross entropy loss for learning the facial
mask where pi is the predicted probability of the i-th pixel
in the binary mask, yi is the ground truth label, and N is
the total number of pixels. LP is the perceptual loss for
learning the facial details, where Ω is a collection of con-
volution layers from the perceptual network and φl is the
activation from the l-th layer. The perceptual loss was origi-
nally proposed by (Johnson et al., 2016) for learning high
level features extracted from a network pretrained on the
ImageNet dataset (Russakovsky et al., 2015). In our work,
the perceptual network is pretrained on a face identification
dataset to enforce that the generated face contains similar
facial features to the original face. More specifically, we
choose the pretrained VGG-19 network (Simonyan & Zisser-
man, 2015) and finetune it with the FaceScrub dataset (Ng &
Winkler, 2014). Lastly, λ1, λ2, and λ3 are the scalar weights
for their corresponding losses. Note that in our implementa-
tion, we have chosen λ1 = 5, λ2 = 1, and λ3 = 1 to ensure
that the terms in LG are within the same numerical order of
magnitude.
4. Experiments
In this section, we will evaluate different loss functions and
analyze the obscuration performance of the generated faces
Figure 3. Example of the augmented face with elastic distortion
and random rotation (left) and its binary mask (right).
compared to Gaussian blurring, pixelation, k-same method
and k-same-net method.
4.1. Datasets
The UTKFace dataset (Zhang et al., 2017) contains 23,708
images with annotations of 68-point facial landmarks and
attributes of age, gender, and skin tone. To obscure the
identifiable information present in the facial landmarks, we
reduce the input landmark points from 68 points to 7 points.
These include the centers of the eyes, the center of the nose,
and four points around the mouth. Therefore, the dimen-
sionality of the attribute vector is 3 and of the landmark
vector is 14. From the perspective of k-anonymity, reduc-
ing landmark points is similar to increasing k. When we
increase k, the size of each cluster also increases, since they
are grouped based on attribute and landmark vectors. There-
fore, the upper bound of identification rate (1/k) decreases,
meaning that the obscuration performance improves.
To verify the obscuration performance, we use the Face-
Scrub dataset for face identification. Note that this dataset
contains 106,806 images from 530 identities. As this dataset
does not provide attributes and landmarks, we use fixed at-
tribute values and detect facial landmarks using the Dlib
toolkit (King, 2009). We can produce fake faces using the
fixed attributes and detected landmarks. We then use a face
identification model (VGG-19) to determine if we are able
to identify these generated faces.
4.2. Data Augmentation
To prevent UP-GAN from simply memorizing the original
face and replicating the output face using the input vectors,
we use data augmentation on the original image Ireal to in-
crease its variation. First, we use elastic distortion (Simard
et al., 2003) to add variety to the facial landmarks. As shown
in Figure 3, the wave-like structure distorts the landmark
points (e.g. the shape of the mouth). We also add random ro-
tations, ranging from −30◦ to 30◦, to increase the variation
of facial poses.
4.3. Results and Discussion
In Figure 4, we compare the results using different loss
functions to show the effectiveness of training with the per-
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Figure 4. Generated faces with different loss functions.
ceptual network and binary mask. We can also see that,
compared to the original face, the generated face with ad-
versarial loss and L2 reconstruction loss can preserve the
facial utility. However, the facial details such as the outlines
are partially missing. By adding the mask loss, we can en-
hance the facial boundary, like the cheek and chin. If we
add the perceptual loss, the generated face visually looks
more realistic with fewer ripple-like artifacts.
We also evaluate the obscuration performance to see how
well UP-GAN can conceal the original faces. We consider
two threat models: I) the attacker (identifier) has no infor-
mation about the obscuration methods and II) the attacker
knows the obscuration methods. In threat model I, we train
the identifier on the pristine images and test it on the ob-
scured faces. In threat model II, we train and test the iden-
tifier on both clear and obscured images. To provide a fair
comparison with the other obscuration methods, we use the
generated faces Ifake as the obscured images, but we do
not swap them into the original images. This is because the
unobscured area (non-facial region) may contain identifi-
able information. Figure 5 shows the visual quality of the
obscured images with different methods including Gaussian
blurring, pixelation, k-same method (Gross et al., 2005),
k-same-net method (Meden et al., 2018)s, and UP-GAN.
We modify the input layers of the k-same net method to
input the same attribute and landmark vectors as UP-GAN.
The obscured face from k-same method is really blurry like
the areas of eyes, although the skin tone is preserved. The
result from k-same-net method contains more facial struc-
tures, but compared to UP-GAN, the facial boundary is not
clear. To further quantify the visual performance, we com-
pute the Fre´chet inception distances (FID) (Heusel et al.,
2017) of the obscured faces. With the assumption that the
real and obscured faces are two sets of realizations coming
from two distributions, FID measures the distance of these
two distributions. Therefore, we can use FID to estimate
how realistic the obscured faces are. As shown in Table 1,
UP-GAN achieves the minimum FID value, which confirms
that the obscured face has the best visual quality.
Table 1 also compares the obscuration performance of UP-
GAN against other methods. For the threat model I, Gaus-
Method Threat Model I Threat Model II FID
None 0.955 0.955 -
Gaussian-5 0.914 0.979 212.36
Gaussian-15 0.360 0.983 386.31
Gaussian-25 0.046 0.923 358.86
Pixelation-5 0.010 0.897 154.26
Pixelation-15 0.003 0.694 576.28
Pixelation-25 0.003 0.191 486.41
k-same 0.003 0.028 91.41
k-same-net 0.003 0.238 252.90
UP-GAN 0.004 0.245 68.78
Table 1. Face identification accuracy and FID of the obscured faces
for different obscuration methods. Note that the method “None”
means no obscuration and k = 10 for the k-same method.
Figure 5. Examples of obscured faces. Top row: original image,
k-same (k = 10) and Gaussian blurring (kernel sizes: 5, 15 and
25). Bottom row: k-same-net, UP-GAN and pixelation (pixel
sizes: 5, 15 and 25).
sian blurring with kernel size 5 and 15 fail to provide an
effective obscuration, while all other methods achieve good
performance. For the threat model II, the obscuration perfor-
mance degrades for all methods, while pixelation with pixel
size 25, k-same, k-same-net, and UP-GAN still achieve
relatively good results. However, as shown in Figure 5, for
pixelation-25 there are only 5× 5 blocks representing the
facial region. As with k-same and k-same-net, the visual
quality of pixelation-25 is worse than UP-GAN.
5. Conclusion
Gaussian blurring or pixelation cannot guarantee obscu-
ration and preserve utility such as age, gender, skin tone,
pose, and expression. Our proposed approach, UP-GAN,
is able to generate faces that preserve utility while also re-
moving identifiable information from the original faces. By
swapping the generated face back on the original image,
we can produce an effective obscuration that not only re-
moves personal identifiable information, but also retains
the information that does not reveal identity. Based on our
results, we show that UP-GAN is able to achieve a better
performance than Gaussian blurring, pixelation, and k-same
method in terms of face obscuration and utility preservation.
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